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TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM
Robert L. Hubbard*
I am pleased to be here today. The usual caveats apply to my
comments: what I say is my own opinion and does not necessarily
reflect the position of New York Attorney General Dennis C.
Vacco, the New York State Department of Law, or any other Attorney General.
As an antitrust prosecutor, I was somewhat puzzled by an invitation to speak on a program entitled healthcare, Poverty, and Autonomy. Although I consider what I do as serving the public
interest for all New Yorkers, including poor New Yorkers, I usually
do not speak on or attend programs with poverty or autonomy in
the title. I do not know whether you believe the forces of competition I espouse represent a breath of fresh air or a destructive hurricane. In any case, I apologize in advance if I speak with a different
vocabulary.
Before I begin, I note that emotions run high in discussions
about healthcare markets. Dramatic changes are underway and
grave uncertainties exist in healthcare markets. The ways in which
people secure and finance healthcare are rapidly changing. Everyone worries whether affordable quality healthcare services will be
available to them. Many in the industry have suffered through significant personal and professional changes. Institutional survival of
hospitals and other healthcare businesses is often at stake. Given
these dynamic forces, asking whether the poor will receive affordable quality health care or be lost in the turmoil is a fair question.
I believe that fostering competition is the best way to relieve
poverty and enhance individual autonomy, that is patient choice, in
healthcare markets. The antitrust laws constitute the foundation
and fundamental strength of our democratic free enterprise system.
To quote the United States Supreme Court, the antitrust laws rest
"on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material pro* Assistant Attorney General, New York State Department of Law; Member,
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gress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions."1 Competition enhances both our democratic and economic
strengths and opportunities, and provides the means to continue
and build upon those strengths and opportunities. The Supreme
Court and I both believe these principles apply in all markets, including healthcare markets.2
I respect and recognize that a competitive system is not the only
choice that the government can make. I also note that for years,
New York chose to displace the antitrust laws and impose a regulatory system in healthcare markets. 3 The economic literature contentiously debates whether competition or regulation better
achieves higher quality and lower costs. 4 Yet, I remain steadfast in

the belief that a competitive system works best. The overall
strength of our economy is testimony to that belief.
1. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The
Court defined the antitrust laws as "a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." Id.; see
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.").
To quote New York's highest court, the antitrust laws promote a public policy "of the
first magnitude." LaRossa v. Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d 583, 589, 468 N.E.2d 19, 22, 479
N.Y.S.2d 181, 184 (1984) (quoting Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products, Inc.,
21 N.Y.2d 621, 625, 237 N.E.2d 223, 224, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1968)).
2. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
3. There are significant limitations on what a state can do to displace competition, which in antitrust parlance is called the state action doctrine. The state action
doctrine illustrates the tension between the supremacy of federal antitrust laws and
federal deference to states under principles of federalism. A state cannot directly
shield private parties from the reach of the federal antitrust laws because a state lacks
the authority to repeal federal antitrust law. Consistent with notions of federalism,
however, the state action doctrine allows a state to: (1) regulate without fear of federal antitrust liability; and (2) expect private compliance with that regulation, even if
compliance might otherwise violate the federal antitrust laws. The active state supervision prong of the state action doctrine in effect prevents a state from indirectly repealing the federal antitrust laws without replacing them with a fully implemented,
regulatory scheme. In short, a state can indirectly limit the reach of the federal antitrust laws only by enacting and actively supervising a regulatory scheme. For a more
traditional description of the state action doctrine, see Sarah Vance, Immunity for
State-Sanctioned Provider CollaborationAfter Ticor, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 411-20
(1994).
4. Compare, e.g., James Robinson & Harold Luft, Competition and the Cost of
Hospital Care,1972 to 1982, 23 JAMA 3241 (1987) (arguing that prices are higher for
hospitals in competitive markets) with Glenn Melnick et al., The Effects of Market
Structure and BargainingPosition on HospitalPrices, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 217 (1992).
(arguing that prices are lower for hospitals in competitive markets).
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Healthcare markets still have regulations that strike me as illogical and anticompetitive. For example, as an antitrust lawyer, I just
do not accept the reasoning behind Certificate of Need (hereinafter CON) laws.5 Under CON laws, before you build a big ticket
medical item, like a heart institute, you have to establish for the
state that the community needs a heart institute. 6 Antitrust lawyers try to eliminate, rather than formalize and erect barriers to
new entry into markets. You do not have to convince some governmental body of a need before you build a building or start a
business, but you do (under CON laws) before you build a heart
institute. For the life of me, I cannot understand why society appropriately allows many frivolous things while it has a policy, as set
forth in CON laws, against too many useful things like heart
institutes.
Nonetheless, the New York State Legislature generally has decided that competition should be the driving force in healthcare
markets.7 After years of the state setting the reimbursement rates
and other aspects of the revenue of hospitals, those rates are now
set by negotiation between hospitals and purchasers.8 Numerous
benefits are already evident. For example, I am heartened to read
that hospitals and other healthcare providers now compete for patients, including Medicaid patients. 9 Government is not really capable of imposing anything more than minimum standards.
Applying the antitrust laws aims for higher than minimum standards. No regulatory system can deliver the quality provided by
the choice among alternatives. Applying the antitrust laws fosters
patient choice, rather than government or doctor control. With
choice, healthcare consumers can choose better (not just minimally
acceptable) healthcare services.
From my perspective, the question to pose is what can be done
to make competition work better. Healthcare markets have significant market imperfections. For example, to be effective the antitrust laws depend upon the flow of market information. Yet,
because third party payers dominate healthcare markets the usual
flow of information about "value" or "quality" just does not occur.
The economic incentives for health care consumers do not foster
5. See N.Y. PuB.

HEALTH LAW

§ 2802 (McKinney 1993).

6. Id. at § 2802(2).
7. 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 639 § 1.
8. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Hospitals Start Open Competition Under a New Law,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1997, at Al.
9. See id.
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competitive changes as well as when third party payers are involved. Co-payments and deductibles do not foster competition as
directly as direct payment by the purchasers of healthcare would.
Moreover, even the most basic frames of reference are not available in healthcare markets. Information on the long term effects of
various regimens of treatment are simply not available in a form
that allows a purchaser of medical services to make an informed
decision on which regimen to choose. This selection is a difficult
task primarily because human health is both complicated and influenced by many factors. Take, for example, back pain. Some doctors urge bed rest. Others recommend surgery to relieve the
pressure that vertebrae inflict on the nerves. Chiropractors do
something else entirely different. No cogent analysis demonstrates
or will demonstrate soon which of these regimens work best.
Healthcare markets would benefit from developing procedures of
gathering information to improve the flow of information. I think
we will continue to do better and recognize that more and more
procedures to measure value and quality of healthcare services are
being developed and standardized.

